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ABSTRACT 
Aim/Purpose Violation of  Information Systems (IS) security policies continue to generate great 
anxiety amongst many organizations that use information systems, partly because 
these violations are carried out by internal employees. This article addresses IS se-
curity policy violations in organizational settings, conceptualizes and problema-
tizes IS security violations by employees of  organizations from a paradox per-
spective. 
Background The paradox is that internal employees are increasingly being perceived as more 
of  a threat to the security of  organizational systems than outsiders. The notion of  
paradox is exemplified in four organizational contexts of; belonging paradox, 
learning paradox, organizing paradox and performing paradox. 
Methodology A qualitative conceptual framework exemplifying how IS security violations occur 
as paradoxes in context to these four areas is presented at the end of  this article. 
Contribution The article contributes to IS security management practice and suggests how IS 
security managers should be positioned to understand violations in light of  this 
paradox perspective.  
Findings The employee generally in the process of  carrying out ordinary activities using 
computing technology exemplifies unique tensions (or paradoxes in belonging, 
learning, organizing and performing) and these tensions would generally tend to 
lead to policy violations when an imbalance occurs. 
Recommendations  
for Practitioners 
IS security managers must be sensitive to employees tensions. 
Future Research A quantitative study, where statistical analysis could be applied to generalize find-
ings could be useful. 
Keywords Information Security, Violations, Paradox, Systematic Literature Review (SLR), 
Security Policies. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Anxiety around the security of  Information Systems (IS) in many organizations has gained fundamental trac-
tion in recent years because of  the threats posed by insider employees (Browne, Lang and Golden, 2015). A 
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primary catalyst for anxiety has been IS security incidents commonly caused by employees who are non-com-
pliant with IS security policies. Employee non-compliance with IS security policies has been noted to lead to 
breaches that have cost organizations millions of  dollars in losses (Herath and Rao, 2009).  
Academic literature points to increased empirical studies on security compliance and violations, in an effort to 
understand and provide ways organizations could mitigate security threats that emanate from non-compliance 
of  security policies by employees. An investigation of  scholarly work around systems security violations 
points to various perspectives that would enlighten the understanding of  these violations. While violation of  
security policies may be maliciously intended, Vroom and von Solms (2004) contend that most violations re-
sult from negligence and ignorance. Management’s response to violations of  negligence and ignorance is of-
ten owning up to failure in IS security governance and the programmes meant to encourage compliance.  
According to Herath and Rao (2009), empirical evidence suggests that employees seldom comply with poli-
cies and moreover many allude to convenience to justify non-compliance. Deterrence theory used in IS re-
search has suggested that unwelcome behavior and behavior that could lead to non-compliance “can be de-
terred through a certain, swift, and/or severe threat of  punishment” (Herath and Rao, 2009). Punishment re-
sulting from non-compliance is a central element of  management decision making process and should not be 
seen as an easy task. It is because of  such unease in decision making that many scholars have embarked on 
understanding inherent underlying complexities and consequences of  violations (Eranova and Prashntham, 
2016). 
COMPLEXITIES IN UNDERSTANDING IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATIONS 
In context to the discipline of  information systems, violation of  security policy could be argued as inherently 
complex and would require a more profound understanding as to why and how security violations occur. The 
“problem” concerning IS security policy violations is an understanding represented in research as that of  a 
continuum between those violations that are voluntary and malicious in nature against those that are non-vol-
untary and non-malicious. Nested within this continuum of  security violations is a deeper but less explicit un-
derstanding of  violations, in this case as, ‘paradoxical’ and failure by research and practice to engage violations 
as paradoxes. Problematizing violations (critically reflecting on IS security violations) is therefore to be seen as 
beneficial to scholar and practice.  
Scholars and practitioners in IS have attempted to problematize IS security violations and to suggest appro-
priate interventions from various other lenses such as neutralization (Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond and Den-
nis, 2013; Siponen and Vance, 2010) and rationalization (Browne, Lang and Golden, 2015; Bulgurcu, Cavuso-
glu and Benbasat, 2010; Vance and Siponen, 2012; Wei and Hsu, 2014). Other empirical studies on security 
violations have drawn on popular IS theories such as Deterrence theory, (Straub, 1990), Protection Motiva-
tion, (Warkentin, Malimage and Malimage, 2012; Siponen, Mahmood and Pahnila, 2014; Browne, Lang and 
Golden, 2015) which are seen as normative and prescriptive. 
In order to better understand the theoretical predisposition of  IS security policy violation, this article builds 
on previous published work on IS security policy violations (Njenga, 2016). What has not been explained 
from the said work is that these violations can be construed uniquely as paradoxes. The paradox perspective, 
borrowed from the discipline of  management, is therefore introduced as an insightful lens in this article. 
There is a limitation of  scholarly work deliberating on IS security policy violations from a paradox perspec-
tive.  It would therefore follow that considering IS security as paradoxes, would be insightful and perhaps of-
fer those in management practices ways to better understand and manage these violations. The purpose of  
this article is to therefore problematize and rationalize IS security violations from the paradox perspective. 
The understanding of  IS security violations is revisited (Njenga, 2016) and then complemented by a distinct 
description of  the nature and meaning surrounding paradoxes within contexts of  these IS security violations. 
The penultimate sections problematize and present a proposed framework for understanding paradoxes in IS 
security discipline. The discussion, implications and conclusion follows thereafter. 
IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATION IN THEORY 
Although a vast majority of  organizations maintain formal written, clear, comprehensive, reasonable and well-
published IS security policies (Abu-Musa, 2004), research has shown that there are violations to these policies. 
A systematic literature review regarding the extent to which these violations occur in organizational context 
Author Last Name 
3 
was carried by Njenga (2016) in a non-biased, replicable, scientific and rigorous way. The purpose of  this re-
view was to apply a tested and sound method of  review in order to understand IS security violations within 
organizations (Morrell, 2008; Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2015; Khoo, Na and Jaidka, 2011).  
The use of  systematic literature reviews is reaffirmed by Okoli and Schabram’s, (2010) commitment to “be 
unaware of  the need for structure in literature reviews” and to “advance policy and practice by providing the 
best evidence available from research” (Morrell, 2008; Atkins and Louw, 2000; Amrollahi et al., 2013).  There 
are many other ways to problematize IS security violations such as hermeneutics (Boell and Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2014), thematic analysis (Bandra, Miskon and Fielt, 2011) or Grounded theory (Wolfswinkel, 
Futmueller and Wilderom, 2013). The use of  systematic literature review was explained as being useful for 
that work because it yielded results necessary to begin to understand how IS violations have been theorized. 
Njenga, (2016) problematized IS security violations by extracting literature based on over 175 articles  from 
scholarly databases in the IS discipline, such as ACM Digital Library, Emerald Management, IEEE Xplore, Sci-
enceDirect and ProQuest. In addition, the AIS eLibrary and the Senior Scholar Basket of  Journals was used. The 
search terms ‘behavior’, ‘violation’ ‘security’ and  ‘policy’ were used to extract relevant articles within the do-
mains of  IS and Psychology (Chapman and Brothers, 2006).  Of  the 175 articles used in that work, screening 
was done and technical papers that did not deal with behavior were excluded (At-kins and Louw, 2000; Okoli 
and Schabram, 2010).  Alternative terminology (non-compliance) was also used in that work to address a well-
known problem in information retrieval described as the ‘indeterminacy of  language’ (Blair, 2006). 
A backward and forward search was mentioned as having been carried out (Levy and Ellis 2006). (Bandara et. 
al., 2011; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Vessey et al., 2002), and is revisited in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Search strategy  
Search terms  ***Search 
in title & 
abstract 
 
Backward 
search 
 
Forward 
search 
Total 
*Number of articles extracted - - - 175 
Number of articles selected for    in-
clusion 
40 3 4 44 
**Number of articles excluded - - - 131 
*number of articles extracted 
**Justification for exclusion of articles: Articles screened for methodical soundness 
*** advanced search in title (security + policy + violation) and (non-compliance)
CATEGORIZING IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATION 
An important outcome towards understanding IS security violations as suggested by Njenga (2016) was the 
disharmony on how various scholars have understood IS security violations under various contexts.  Table 2 
below summarizes such disharmony which suggests a scholarly understanding of  IS security violations exist-
ing in a continuum. 
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Table 2. Various Categorizations of  IS Security Policy Violations (Njenga, 2016). 
Authors  Various categorizations of  IS security violations by various scholars 
 
Aurigemma and 
Mattson (2014) 
(1) malicious (intentional 
and deviant) 
  (2) non-malicious (volition 
and non-volition) 
Barlow, Warkentin, 
Ormond and Dennis 
(2013) 
(1) malicious  (2) deviant behavior (3) non-malicious 
Dang (2014)   (1) intentional malicious 
abuse 
 (2) volitional (but not 
malicious noncompli-
ance) 
(1) non-volitional noncom-
pliance 
Guo and Yuan (2012)  (1) knowingly break rules 
(malicious) 
(2) intentional (3) in-voluntary (4) non-malicious  
Kraemer and Carayon 
(2007)  
(1) violations of malicious 
intent  
(2) violations of a non-
malicious intent 
Martin and Imboden 
(2014) 
 (1) intentional and mali-
cious 
(2) passive and  non-
volitional 
(3) volitional, and non-
malicious 
Siponen and Vance 
(2014) 
(1) deliberate violations   (2) non-deliberate 
     
EMERGENT PERSPECTIVES IN IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATION 
As Table 2 above has shown, various scholars have categorized IS security violations on a continuum ranging 
from malicious to non-malicious violations. The categorization of  IS security policy violation is seen as an 
important task which is deconstructed in Van Den Bergh and Njenga (2016). This conceptual categorization 
is as a results of  a response to a call by Crossler et al., (2013) in their article titled “Future directions for be-
havioral information security research” who encourage scholars to try and separate and categorize various 
violations (such as insider employee malicious misbehavior from deviant behavior and non-malicious behav-
ior).   
Categorization of  IS security policy violation is important for management practices, particularly because this 
would improve on the success and applicability of  corrective action towards the various kinds of  behavior 
(Crossler et al., 2013). Although it would not be the primary aim of  any IS security study to just simply cate-
gorize violation behavior only, it remains important to reference such categorization and map out how effec-
tively the categories could be balanced with the right possible deterrence effect (Loch et al., 1992). As an ex-
ample Loch et al., (1992) have used the human perpetrator’s accidental and intentional intent as part of  a fur-
ther study that ultimately develops a security threat taxonomy based on accidental and intentional behavior. 
Van Den Berg and Njenga (2016) explain the importance of  using a classification schema called the ‘Triad of  
Internal Threat Agent Behaviors’ to represent the three classes of  security behavior in IS security literature, 
that would be important in enabling management to create their own threat taxonomy, based on the various 
types of  IS security policy violations.   
The idea of  using a categorization of  behavior to develop a threat taxonomy has been applied in the organi-
zational context, as shown by the work of  Willison and Warkentin (2013) who have focused on a holistic ap-
proach to insider computer abuse. They have considered the thought processes of  human perpetrators pre-
ceding deterrence and have extended Loch et al.,’s (1992) threat taxonomy, focusing on the human perpetrator 
(Van Den Berg and Njenga 2016). 
Willison and Warkentin (2013) approach is similar and in agreement with Loch et al.,’s (1992) taxonomy of  
behavior as intentional, but has differed on the term “accidental” violations by replacing it with the term 
“passive” violations. They then proceeded to expand the taxonomy to passive non-volitional noncompliance, 
volitional but not malicious non-compliance, and intentional malicious computer abuse. 
Author Last Name 
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INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES IN IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATION 
In addition to various scholars categorizing IS security policy violations as a continuum of  violations ranging 
from the extreme malicious, to the unintentional, and non-volitional non-malicious acts, other scholars have 
used other lenses from disciplines outside of  IS such as sociology to explain IS security policy violations. 
Cheng, Li, Li, Holm and Zhai (2013) for instance look at IS security policy violations occurring as a result of  
employees’ weaker social bonds to their mangers, co-workers and organizations. They see this as most likely 
leading to and influencing their willingness to engage in violations.  
D’Arcy, Gupta, Tarafdar and Ofir (2014) on the other hand have addressed the extreme end of  the contin-
uum and focus their work on those acts that exemplify the “dark side” of  IT use. Their empirical studies ex-
plain that what motivates employees towards IS security policy violation is increased stress levels, work over-
load, interruptions and Internet addiction ultimately creating unintended consequences.  They propose that 
these unintended violations could be moderated by sanctions and moral considerations. Kraemer and 
Carayon’s (2007) work has involved looking at IS security violations in general from the human perspective 
and advocates that these violations could be as a result of  human error. They see acts of  procedural viola-
tions arising as a result of  constructs such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negli-
gence, and recklessness. Moderators to these constructs of  human error would be campaigns, appeal to fear, 
disciplinary measures, threat of  litigation and the naming, blaming and shaming approach.  
From a business standpoint, Maasberg (2014) outlines the taxonomy of  insider espionage as an outcome of  
personal crisis and disposition for civil disobedience which could lead to intellectual property theft, fraud or 
sabotage. Siponen and Vance (2010) in the interdisciplinary study of  criminology and information systems 
security, present neutralization techniques that are used by employees to decrease the perceived harm of  their 
policy violations. Ugrin and Pearson (2010) in the social sciences discipline, have conducted empirical studies 
on cyber-loafing and the viewing and exposing others to pornography as a form of  non-compliance to inter-
nal organizational policies. Warkentin, Malimage and Malimage (2012) who base their work on criminology 
studies suggest that depending on the types of  sanctions present, positive (reward) or negative (punishment), 
these may influence employees differently across different cultures. Interestingly, Takemura’s (2014) empirical 
studies in Japanese culture suggests that violating security policy cannot necessarily be deterred through the 
threat of  punishment.  
A summary of  the various theoretical aspects of  IS security policy violations from many other scholars on 
the work of  IS security violations can be drawn from Table 3, (Njenga, 2016). Table 3 shows various theo-
retical underpinnings used by one or more scholars to explain instances and moderations pertaining to IS se-
curity policy violations.  General Deterrence Theory (GDT), is seen as the most popular theory that would 
explain violations with more scholars using this theoretical lens to explain violations under various contexts. 
In addition, Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) has also been revealed to be popular within scholarly work. 
An interesting approach to violation of  security policies has also been suggested by the works of  Brunel, 
Cuppens, Cuppens, Sans and Bodeveix (2007) who consider breach of  permission and obligation require-
ments  from a behavior model that uses ‘Labeled Kripke Structures’.  In more recent studies, Hu et al., (2014) 
look at security violations from a Lab based neuroscience perspective. What is novel is how they apply brain 
imaging technologies-magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) to explain self-
control as an inhibitor of  desire for immediate gratification  and how low self-control could short circuit 
moral judgement and rational choice. There were instances where scholarly work was coded for two or more 
theories used by scholars to explain information security policy violations (Aurigemma and Mattson, 2014; 
Bansal and Zahedi, 2015; Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond and Dennis, 2013; Browne, Lang and Golden, 2015; 
Cheng, Li, Li, Holm and Zhai, 2013). 
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Table 3. Various Categorizations of  IS Security Policy Violations (Njenga, 2016). 
Theories used Systematized Literature Review Sources Influences to Violating Security Policies  
Personal Construct Theory, 2Almusharraf, Dhillon and Samonas (2015); Insufficient understanding, personal constructs, not assigning responsibility ownership or 
role, 
Theory of Planned  
Behavior 
2Aurigemma and Mattson (2014); 2Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and  Benbasat (2010); 2Ifinedo 
(2014) ; 3Takemura (2014); 2Wei and Hsu (2014) ; 3Herath and Rao (2009) 
sanctions are significant antecedent to user intentions to comply with security policies 
 
General Deterrence Theory 
2Aurigemma and Mattson (2014);  3Cheng, Li, Li, Holm and Zhai (2013); 3Hovav and 
D’Arcy (2012) ; 3Siponen and Vance (2010);  3Takemura (2014) ; 3Ugrin and  Pearson (2010); 
3Warkentin, Malimage and Malimage (2012) ; 3Herath and Rao (2009); 2Straub 1990; 
Sanctions , punishment, shaming, will deter compliance to policies – drivers include Ig-
norance, apathy, resistance, disobedience, 
Attribution theory 3Bansal and Zahedi (2015) ;  emotional displeasures, perceived justices of organization, 
Organizational justice theory 3Bansal and Zahedi (2015); 3Dang (2014); commercial incentive/profit, 
Theory of neutralization 3Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond and Dennis (2013); 3Siponen and Vance (2010) Neutralization to justify deviant action, rationalization ; Deference of necessity, denial 
of injury, Metaphor of ledger 
Framing theory 3Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond and Dennis (2013); Individual  propensity and moral belief, perceived justice of punishment, cognitive pro-
cessing, moral reasoning,  mandatoriness of policies 
Protection Motivation Theory
 
3Browne, Lang and Golden (2015); 3Siponen, Mahmood and Pahnila (2014); 3Warkentin, 
Malimage and Malimage (2012); 3Warkentin, McBride, Carter and Johnston (2012) ; 3Herath 
and Rao (2009);  
Hedonistic feelings (thrill, pleasure), Intrinsic benefit
Emotional state: Sanctions can moderate  
Rational Choice Theory 3Browne, Lang and Golden (2015) ; 3Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and  Benbasat (2010); 3Vance 
and Siponen (2012) ; 3Wei and Hsu (2014)  
rationality-based ; threat appraisal and coping appraisal
Sensemaking theory 2Chang and Seow (2014) perceived clashes between the underlying values
Social bond theory. 3Cheng, Li, Li, Holm and Zhai (2013); 3Safa, Von Solm and  Furnell (2016) Weaker social bonds more likely to engage in a white-collar crime; attachment, commit-
ment, involvement  
General Strain Theory 3Dang (2014); pre-kinetic events: disgruntlement ,Job dissatisfaction, sanction pressure 
Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior 2Molok, Ahmad and Chang (2010); 3Herath and Rao (2009) attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control
explain violations 
Social Bond Theory 3Ifinedo (2014); 3Safa, Von Solm and  Furnell (2016); 3Cheng, Li, Li, Holm and Zhai (2013) Lacking in knowledge sharing, collaboration, intervention and experience leads to vio-
lations 
Involvement theory 3Safa, Von Solm and  Furnell (2016) ; Attachment, commitment, involvement and belief
Organisational commitment 3Herath and Rao (2009) penalties, social pressure and intrinsic motivation, can  explain  variance in employees’ 
intention to comply with rules  
Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) 3Siponen, Mahmood and Pahnila (2014);  Cognitively evaluate: ( threat and coping appraisals)  
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) 3Siponen, Mahmood and Pahnila (2014);  Attitudes and subjective norms  
General theory of crime 2Hu,  West and Smarandescu (2014) ; low self-control: propensity toward criminal behavior/ violations 
1**No theory Used in articles (literature)  Choi, Levy and  Anat (2012), D’Arcy, Gupta, Tarafdar and Ofir Turel (2014); D'Arcy et al.,
2009; 
Guo and Yuan (2012); Guo et al., 2011; Hu et. al, (2011); Hu,  West and Smarandescu 
(2014); Johnston and Warkentin (2010) ; Kraemer and Carayon (2007) ; Kretzer and Mäd-
che (2015); Maasberg (2014);  Martin and  Imboden (2014) ; Siponen and Vance  (2014); 
Vance et al., 2012) ; Willison and Warkentin (2013); Crossler et al., (2013) 
1**conceptual papers
2 Theory used with  empirical evidence in article –empirical research papers  
3 Article uses more than one theoretical lens – Some articles applied multi-theories in the empirical work  
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An important consideration arising from the previous sections that have addressed various perspectives of  
scholarly work on IS security policy violation is the omission of  the paradox perspective to problematize IS 
security violations.  The next section suggests how the paradox perspective could be used to problematize 
such violations in useful and insightful ways.  
PARADOXES IN PRACTICE 
According to Eranova and Prashntham, (2016) paradoxes are “elements that seem logical in isolation but ab-
surd and irrational when appearing simultaneously”. These social constructs are seen as both logical and ab-
surd. Understanding paradoxes has appealed to management research literature (Smith and Lewis, 2011; 
Smith and Tushman, 2005) because of  the influence it has on models for decision making (Robison, Shupp 
and Myers, 2010). Rooted in Management discipline regarding paradox is work by Smith and Lewis (2011) 
who explain the paradox perspective in management. The paradox paradigm would be an important perspec-
tive to consider in the context of   IS security policy violations since it offers an alternative to other previously 
held paradigms (such as neutralization and rationalization explained in earlier sections) in the IS discipline.  
The paradox perspective holds on to the idea that confirming opposing forces can be useful in understanding 
complex and dynamic environments (Eranova and Prashntham, 2016). In IS security literature, this is im-
portant because of  the various tensions that exist between the practice of  using people as part of  the control 
systems (distinctly and at the same time collectively) while simultaneously strengthening system controls from  
the same people who run these systems. This aspect is seen as problematic. Tension is problematized as fol-
lows; organizations do need people but at the same time it is those very people who pose a bigger risk to 
these organizations.  Indeed, tensions are key to identifying and understanding organizational paradoxes par-
ticularly in IS security domains because of  a “tug-of-war between opposing forces” of  security controls and 
people (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2010). It is important to understand tension within the IS security domain 
because in security matters, there are inherent contradictions and inconsistencies. One such contradiction is 
that of  attempting to restrict security access to information resources while simultaneously advocating for 
performance. The simultaneous presence of  opposites (access and restricted use) becomes part of  an every-
day information security concern. Failure and tension is therefore revealed by the numerous IS security viola-
tions and breaches reported.   
Organizational paradoxes and tensions are well documented by Smith and Lewis’s (2011) work which is based 
on a sample of  360 journal articles, survey over 12 years across 12 management journals. A synthesis of  liter-
ature is carried out through a paradox framework which categorizes paradoxes across four areas of; belong-
ing, learning, organizing and per-forming.  This is shown by Figure 1. 
 
  
Figure 1: Paradox Framework - Smith and Lewis (2011) 
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The four categories of  paradox identified in Figure 1 above, and applicable to the IS security management 
domain represent the core management activities within organizational settings. According to Smith and 
Lewis, (2011) the learning paradox is characterized by the tensions in the shaping of  new and destroying of  old 
systems.  The belonging paradox is characterized by the tensions of  the individual against the collective where 
employees are likely to face opposing yet co-existing roles. The organizational paradox is characterized by the 
tensions of  routine vis-à-vis change and of  collaboration, vis-à-vis competition. The performing paradox is charac-
terized by the tension of  differing and conflicting demands of  various stakeholders.  
THE PARADOX PERSPECTIVE IN IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATION  
LEARNING PARADOX: TENSIONS TOWARDS IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATIONS 
Within IS security practices, there are continuous efforts to renew, change, and innovate, which are seen as 
paramount for sustainable IS security initiatives.  This is because of  the emergent nature of  security threats 
such as new viruses, new worms, new malware and new sets of  risks associated with evolving hacking attacks. 
Mitigating against these security risks must be done against the background of  destroying old practices and 
systems. The destruction of  the old and reinventing new systems is seen as a security practices that will ulti-
mately create tensions.  
An important new and emerging system change is the growing use and introduction of  mobile devices into 
organizational spaces and shared networks which has created new security concerns.  If  these devices are lost 
or stolen as a result of  negligence on the part of  the employees, potentially sensitive organizational data resid-
ing in these devices maybe accessed by unauthorized users (Martin and Imboden, 2014). This use of  mobile 
devices will create opportunities for learning. An interesting learning paradox is the extent to which organiza-
tions address such challenges posed to IS security practitioners on whether or not to allow or restrict the use 
of  these devices. Emotional displeasure and tensions are bound to occur on either choice of  use. Bansal and 
Zahedi (2015) in their use of  Attribution theory talk of  emotional displeasures that result from changes in 
ways people have previously interacted with systems and this often becoming a cause for violations of  these 
systems. The paradox is that unavoidably, change must happen, but change is not pleasurable.  
BELONGING PARADOX: TENSIONS TOWARDS IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATIONS 
The idea of  belonging can be explained using social science theories such as Social bond theory (SBT) used 
by scholars in IS security research to explain deviance (Safa, Von Solm and Furnell, 2016). Deviance towards 
IS security policies occurs when the social bond (and lack of  belonging) is perceived as weak from an em-
ployee’s perspective. If  for instance it is perceived that attachment, involvement and commitment to these 
systems is limited, and that employees do not see themselves as part of  the system, their tendency to violate 
IS security policies increases correspondingly.  
Different and competing roles that forces employees to fluctuate between acting as a collective units or acting 
as individuals create a belonging paradox which is ultimately characterized by violations.  Almusharraf, Dhil-
lon and Samonas (2015) have used the Personal Construct Theory to explain these tensions and suggest that 
insufficient understanding or roles and duties, policies and structures anchored on different personal con-
structs create tensions in responsibilities, ownership and role.  
As an example, IS security policy that deal with privacy is underscored  by tensions of   belonging, since peo-
ple could be inclined to share organizational information in order to have a sense of  belonging to that organi-
zation , while on the same breath strongly object to the very organization’s uncontrolled use of  personal their 
data (Kokolakis, 2015). 
PERFORMING PARADOX: TENSIONS TOWARDS IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATIONS 
There are various stakeholders in the development, implementation and enforcing IS security policies. The 
plurality and attrition of  performance amongst these stakeholders often causes competing goals, as each seeks 
success in performance from their own perspectives. IT security developers see completeness and complexi-
ties of  security controls from technical perspectives, while IT managers are much more motivated towards 
ideals of  protective measure to deter and prevent system abuse from the softer qualitative managerial per-
spectives. An apparent paradox and contradiction is presented in the form of  competing goals such as softer 
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qualitative goals vis-a-vis technical quantitative performance goals (Das and Teng, 2000). A paradox of  perfor-
mance in this instance can manifest when the level of  involvement and commitment leading to performance 
and adherence to security policies is shaped by the qualitative aspects of  attitude (short-term personal gain 
verses long term personal gain). Involvement Theory discusses the level of  energy, time and participation in a 
particular activity and has been used by IS researcher to explain violations (Safa, Von Solm and Furnell, 2016).   
ORGANIZING PARADOX: TENSIONS TOWARDS IS SECURITY POLICY VIOLATIONS 
IS security practitioners and employees work within organizational structures that foster competition and co-
operation simultaneously resulting in various tensions. According to Das and Teng, (2000) while cooperation 
ultimately seeks value creation, seen as a positive-sum game with shared benefits, conversely competition de-
mands opportunistic behavior and is seen as a zero-sum game and that the benefits accrued are personal.   
The framework below shown by Figure 2 presents a summary of  these four paradox perspectives within 
these IS security contexts and which problematizes IS security policy violations as Paradoxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Problematizing IS security policy violations as paradoxes is indeed an insightful way of  appreciating how vio-
lations of  IS security policies occur. Context is elucidated from an ‘either/or’ framework that envisages two 
opposites as mutually independent with only one of  the two operating at a given time. The employee gener-
ally in the process of  carrying out ordinary activities using computing technology exemplifies unique tensions 
(or paradoxes in belonging, learning, organizing and performing) and these tensions would generally tend to 
lead to policy violations when an imbalance occurs. This is an interesting perspective that IS security literature 
has not considered before. Such a perspective offers an opportunity for managers to understand that an im-
 
Figure 2: Problematizing IS security violations as a Paradox violations 
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balance surrounding an employee’s inability to manage their need of  belonging, learning, organizing and per-
forming on the context of  adhering to security policies will make it possible for the employee to be perceived 
as more of  a threat to the security of  an organization systems as opposed to an outsider. This suggestion is 
backed up by Barlow et al., (2013), where they present data from a survey that shows that 80 percent of  chief  
information security officers (CISOs) believe that employees present a greater threat to their data than exter-
nal hackers.  
Understanding the framework presented in Figure 2 which problematizes IS security policy violations as para-
doxes is one step closer towards enabling better decisions being made by managers regarding how to remedy 
these IS security violations. Indeed the paradox management approach invites managers to continuously ad-
just decisions and actions by appreciating the tensions and conflicting pressures employees face. This idea is 
compelling and also compatible with the findings of  Ricciardi et al., (2016), who confirm that paradoxical di-
mensions of  organizational dynamism enable adaptive regeneration of  various models. IS security policy for-
mulation and policy management could be seen as one such model where dynamism and adaptive regenera-
tion is to be encouraged.   
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IS SECURITY MANAGEMENT  
From an understanding of  Figure 2 framework above, and the discussions thereon, it remains very possible 
for IS security managers to harness paradoxical tensions as conduits to IS security innovation and adaptive 
regeneration (Ricciardi et al., 2016). While it is discerning that IS security policy violations could be construed 
as paradoxes characterized by contradictory propositions, the important thing to note is that IS security man-
agers do not necessarily have to address or make a choice between these contradictions. This may seem radi-
cal at first but, importantly, Smith and Lewis (2011) argue that it is possible to “generate responses that em-
brace the tensions and synergise the opposing propositions”. This they argue presents management with the 
opportunity to; (1) push conceptual and cognitive limitations and (2) spark sense-making and creative think-
ing, which in turn can lead to flexibility and fluidity (Smith and Lewis, 2011) as cited by Tse (2013). What this 
means to the IS security domain is that while the employee is to be seen as a threat to the organization (when 
they violate IS security policies, they should paradoxically be also be equally and uniquely seen as the solutions 
to IS security threats, while also being co-creators of  such policies.  The following recommendations are sug-
gested in line with understanding violation paradoxes. 
1. IS security managers must be sensitive to employees tensions leading to violations which could arise 
from emotional displeasure, insufficient understanding about tasks, competing goals as well as when 
employees compete and cooperate with each other. Rather than focusing on tensions/contradictions 
from an ‘either/or’ perspective, such that there is a solution for every one side of  a problem, managers 
must value both sides of  tensions and embrace a ‘both/and’ perspective, that synergizes opposing per-
spectives. Formal reporting of  tensions is to be encouraged.  
2. Mangers must learn about how to detect early warning signs arising from tensions. A record must be 
kept of  these early warning signs leading to IS security violations and records must be mapped against 
an agreed threat taxonomy to the organization.  IS security managers should cultivate a culture of  re-
cording and acknowledging accomplishment of  tasks that mitigate threats as a first step in addressing 
organizational tensions. They should understand that employees are valuable assets to organizations 
and that their needs and actions also matter. They should consider their own perspectives as well as 
employee perspectives as complementary and additives, such that when IS security policy violations 
occur and are recorded, these should be seen as unique opportunities for learning.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This work has been both descriptive and analytical while covering important scientific literature regarding in-
ternal IS security policy violations. The paradox perspective which considers IS security policy violations from 
multiple disciplines has been conceptualized. It would be useful to build further on this work by incorporat-
ing the paradox perspective as an important theoretical lens in the discipline of  information systems security 
and to empirically test this across various regions in the world. A quantitative study, where statistical analysis 
could be applied to generalize findings could be useful for this purpose.  
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CONCLUSION 
This article has placed context to organizations where high levels of  anxiety is faced by managers due to in-
creased IS security policy violations. The complexities on how to manage these violations has been presented 
and explained. There has been a lot of  interest and empirical work done regarding IS security policy viola-
tions as show by the systematic literature review presented in the first sections of  this article. The need to un-
derstand what literature says around IS security policy violations and to problematize these violations (as par-
adoxes) as shown by the other sections of  this work is not only important but timely. This is true considering 
that the study of  IS security violations continues to receive a great deal of  attention in IS literature.   
The article ends up by suggesting an insightful perspective regarding IS security policy violations that are to 
be construed uniquely as paradoxes. Specific recommendations that could mitigate organizational tensions are 
presented. The paradox framework for IS security policy violations has been presented as a way to guide man-
agement on how to effectively intervene. What this means to IS security management is that it is still possible 
for them to harness paradoxical tensions as conduits to technology (security) innovation rather than try to 
hinder these. A much broader study embarking on more qualitative and systematic studies that touch on para-
doxical tensions in many other IS security activities is also encouraged. Such a study would further the under-
standing of  various undertakings within the domain of  information systems security.   
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